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Abstract
Undesirable consequences of dangerous goods incidents can be mitigated by quick arrival of specialized response
teams at the accident site. We present a novel methodology to determine the optimal design of a specialized team
network so as to maximize its ability to respond to such incidents in a region. We show that this problem can be
represented via a maximal arc-covering model.We discuss two formulations for the maximal arc-covering problem,
a known one and a new one. Through computational experiments, we establish that the known formulation has
excessive computational requirements for large-scale problems, whereas the alternative model constitutes a basis
for an efﬁcient heuristic. The methodology is applied to assess the emergency response capability to transport
incidents, that involve gasoline, in Quebec and Ontario. We point out the possibility of a signiﬁcant improvement
via relocation of the existing specialized teams, which are currently stationed at the shipment origins.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A substantial amount of hazardousmaterials (hazmats), such as ﬂammable liquids and poisonous gases,
need to be transported prior to their consumption or disposal. The US Department of Transportation [1],
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for example, estimates that there were 300 million dangerous goods shipments in 1998 and forecasts a
2% annual growth in the amount of hazmats produced in the country. Despite widespread deregulation
of transport industry, mitigation of the public and environmental risks associated with these shipments
remains a government responsibility. A number of transport safety measures aim at reducing the like-
lihood and possible undesirable consequences of incidents involving accidental release of dangerous
goods during transportation. This proactive group of policy tools includes the use of low-risk routes for
hazmat shipments, regulatory requirements for driver training, driving hours and container speciﬁcations,
inspections to enforce compliance, and closure of certain road segments to vehicles carrying dangerous
goods. Nonetheless, accidents do happen. During the 1990–1998 period, for example, there were an
average of 410 serious hazmat incidents in the US annually, which caused fatalities, injuries, evacua-
tion of homes and businesses as well as property damage [1]. When a hazmat incident occurs, effective
emergency response is crucial for containing its impact to the smallest possible area around the accident
site. Clearly, such reactive safety measures complement the proactive policies in mitigating undesirable
consequences of transport incidents. The establishment of a hazmat emergency response system, which
is the focus of this paper, constitutes a building block toward a comprehensive public and environmental
safety infrastructure.
The ﬁreﬁghters, paramedics and police in the vicinity of accident site are typically ﬁrst to respond to
a transport accident. It is important that they quickly identify the type of hazmat involved (if any) in the
incident and take precautions to protect the general public during the initial response phase. To facilitate
this, the US, Canada and Mexico require each potentially hazardous vehicle to carry a placard indicating
the type (4-digit ID number) of its cargo. Also, a guidebook is developed jointly by the three transport
ministries to aid the ﬁrst-responders e.g., the area to be evacuated depending on hazmat type and the
size of spill [2]. In most cases, however, it is necessary to send a specialized hazmat response team and
equipment to the accident site. It is crucial that the availability and involvement of such specialized teams
are planned prior to dangerous goods shipments. In Canada, the 1992 Transportation of Dangerous Goods
Act, in fact, requires each shipper to have an approved emergency response assistance plan (ERAP) before
transporting or importing dangerous goods. An ERAP must provide a description of the arrangements
for specialized emergency response, a potential accident assessment as well as a contact person the ﬁrst-
responders need to call to activate the plan. The ﬁnal phase of emergency response to hazmat incidents
is the cleanup of the accident site, which is usually overseen by an environmental protection agency with
jurisdiction.
The current practice and regulation of dangerous goods emergency response emphasize the availability
of information, the coordination among responders and the procedures that need to be followed at the
accident site. Although accidents can occur during loading and unloading of hazmats, our focus in this
paper is on possible incidents during transportation. The time it takes for the specialized response team
to arrive at the accident site is another crucial factor, which seems to be overlooked by regulators. In
Canada, for example, there are no established response time standards that are used by Transport Canada
in the approval process of ERAPs [3]. The importance of quick response in alleviating undesirable
consequences of hazmat incidents, however, has been recognized in a number of occasions. One example
is the 1998 derailment of a CSX freight train in West Virginia that resulted in the release of 21,500
gallons of formaldehyde solution from two railcars. In a safety recommendation report following this
accident, US National Transportation Safety Board [4] stated that the three-hour delay in the arrival of
specialized teams could have had serious consequences had the leaking chemicals been more hazardous
than formaldehyde.A recent report by the same agency recommended the inclusion of railroad mileposts
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in emergency responsemaps throughout the US so as tominimize response times [5]. In January 2002, the
governor of North Dakota highlighted the fast response of emergency management teams to a Canadian
Paciﬁc Railway train derailment as the main factor that kept the damage caused by this spectacular
accident1 relatively low [6].
In this paper, we provide a methodology for determining the optimal locations of specialized response
team stations so as to maximize their ability to respond to hazmat incidents within a threshold time. We
assume that the number of stations to be established is pre-determined. The required equipment, expertise
and response time varies with the characteristics of dangerous good involved in the incident. Therefore,
a separate emergency response station network needs to be established for each hazmat category that is
shipped in high volumes across a region. The concept of location coverage is pertinent for representing the
objective of our problem. If a potential incident site can be reached from one of the emergency response
stationswithin the threshold time, then this location is considered covered. Note that the incident can occur
anywhere on the transport network used for dangerous goods shipments. The number of specialized teams
is often insufﬁcient to cover the entire transport network and the road links with higher risk need to be
prioritized. In a critical overview, Erkut and Verter [7] identify population exposure, incident probability
and expected risk (i.e., probability times exposure) as the prevailing models for hazmat transport risk.
These risk attributes determine the relative signiﬁcance of providing emergency response coverage to
each road link.
The hazmat emergency response network design problem can be solved via a maximal arc-covering
location model. This is an extension of the maximal covering location model, which has been used in
siting non-hazmat emergency services such as ﬁre stations, ambulance stations and blood banks (see
[8] for references). The original model, developed by Church and ReVelle [9], seeks to maximize the
coverage provided to a set of demand points each corresponding to a population center. Point coverage
has remained as a common structural property of the numerous extensions proposed within the past
three decades. We refer the reader to Marianov and Serra [10] for a recent review of this literature. The
distinguishing feature of hazmat emergency response is that it requires coverage of a set of arcs that make
up the transport network rather than a set of points. There has been limited work on the maximal arc-
covering location problem. It was ﬁrst introduced within the context of set covering models as described
in [11] and later extended to the maximal covering location model in [12]. They proved that an optimal
solution to the problem exists in a ﬁnite dominating set of points which they call NIPS. Using NIPS
they formulated the problem as an integer linear program similar to that of the maximal (node) covering
location problem (MCLP). In this paper, we also present an alternative formulation of the problem. We
are unaware of any other previous work on the maximal arc-covering location model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The problem is deﬁned in Section 2 where we
also discuss two formulations and methods to solve the problem. Section 3 reports on our computational
experiments that establish the need for the development of a heuristic procedure as well as the efﬁciency
of a greedy heuristic based on our formulation. An application of our methodology for designing an
emergency response system to gasoline incidents in Quebec and Ontario highways is presented in Section
4. Section 5 provides our concluding comments.
1 240,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia were released from eight ruptured tank-cars.
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2. The problem
LetG=(N,A) be a networkwith a nodal setN and an arc setA.Associatedwith each arc (i, j) there is a
weightwij which represents the beneﬁt of covering entirely arc (i, j) ∈ A. In the context of hazmat trans-
portation, the arcs correspond to road links whereas the nodes represent shipment origins/destinations,
potential response facility locations and road intersections. In this paper, we use population exposure as
the measure of transport risk, and hence arc weights are the number of people within a threshold distance
of the road link multiplied by the number of hazmat trucks shipped across that link. Let dij designate the
length of arc (i, j) and d(x, y) the shortest distance between any pair of points x, y ∈ G. We denote by
p the number of (response) facilities to be located on the network.
The maximal arc-covering problem involves locating p facilities so as to maximize the total weighted
arc length covered. A point y ∈ G is covered by a facility at x ∈ G if d(x, y)R, where R is the
pre-determined coverage distance. Let Zkl(S) denote the fraction of arc (k, l) ∈ A covered by a set of
facilities located at S ⊆ G (i.e., 0Zkl(S)1). Thus, the problem is
max
S⊆G|S|=p
w(S) =
∑
(k,l)∈A
wklZkl(S). (1)
Following [12], we allow facility placement only on the set of nodes N. Any potential location which
is not a node can be made to be a node and the coverage of a new arc that is incident to such a node can
be proportionally adjusted. For example, if wkl = 10 and dkl = 50 and point m at a distance of 5 from
node k on arc (k, l) is a potential location, for new arc (k,m), dkm = 5, wkm = ( 550 )(10) = 1 and for new
arc (m, l), dml = 45, wml = 4550 (10) = 9. Therefore we can change G to N in (1).
2.1. The formulation of Church and Meadows [12]
The formulation is based on the Network Intersect Point Set (NIPS), which is also the dominating set
of points in G for both the maximal node cover and arc cover problems. To deﬁne NIPS, Church and
Meadows ﬁrst deﬁne NIP as any point that is R units of distance away from any node i ∈ N . Then, NIPS
is the set of all NIPs and the nodes. Next, they call any segment between two adjacent points of NIPS
(not including the two end points), a segment of equal coverage (SEC).
Notice that all points in a given SEC arc are covered by exactly the same nodes. Suppose there are K
SECs on the network.
Let N(SECk) be the set of all nodes that cover any point lying within SECk for k = 1, . . . , K .
Let
yj =
{
1 if a facility is located at node j,
0 otherwise,
zk =
{
1 if SECk is covered,
0 otherwise.
Let A(k) be the arc that contains SECk and wk its weight. Let vk = wkl(SECk)/dA(k) where l(SECk)
and dA(k) are, respectively, the lengths of SECk and arc A(k).
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Fig. 1. A 3 node network.
The problem is
(P1)
max
K∑
k=1
vkzk
s.t. ∑
j∈N(SECk)
yj zk, k = 1, . . . , K , (2)
n∑
j=1
yj = p, (3)
xj , zk = 0, 1.
Constraints (2) ensure that if SECk is covered only if there is a facility located at atleast one of the
nodes that covers SECk . In constraint (3) we limit the number of facilities to p. Church and Meadows use
a commercial solver to solve this problem.
Example 1. Consider the three-node network, where R = 312 and p = 2 where the length of links is
indicated in bold and length of segments in regular font (e.g. l(1, 2) = 3 and l2A = .5). Suppose all arc
weights are equal to 1 (Fig. 1).
There are 8 SECs: 12, 2A, AE, EC, C3, 1D, DB, B3 with, respectively, corresponding variables
z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8.
NIPS = {1, 2, 3, A, B,C,D,E}.
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The problem is
max
{
z1 + 110 z2 + 15 z3 + 25 z4 + 310 z5 + 18 z6 + 34 z7 + 18 z8
}
s.t.
y1 + y2z1,
y1 + y2z2,
y2z3,
y2 + y3z4,
y3z5,
y1 + y2z6,
y1 + y3z7,
y3z8,
y1 + y2 + y3 = 2,
y1, y2, y3, z1, z2, . . . , z8 = 0, 1.
In this problem there are 11 binary variables and nine linear constraints.
2.2. The alternative formulation
In addition to the binary variables yj deﬁned earlier, we deﬁne Zkl as the fraction of arc (k, l) covered.
We also deﬁne parameters ajkl, j ∈ N, (k, l) ∈ A, as the fraction of arc (k, l) covered by a facility located
at node j through node k.
ajkl =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if d(j, k) + dklR,
R − d(j, k)
dkl
if d(j, k)R<d(j, k) + dkl,
0 otherwise.
(4)
We denote the fraction of coverage provided by the facility at node j via node l as ajlk , which can be
computed by replacing d(j, k) with d(j, l) in (4). Notice that the total coverage of arc (k, l) by facility j
cannot exceed 100%, and hence, to avoid double counting Zkl is equal to min{aklj + ajlk, 1}.
We can now formulate problem (P2).
(P2)
max
∑
(k,l)∈A
wklZkl
s.t. ∑
j∈N
yj = p,
max
j∈N {yjajkl} + maxj∈N {yjajlk}Zkl (k, l) ∈ A, (5)
0Zkl1 (k, l) ∈ A, (6)
yj = 0, 1, j ∈ N .
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Table 1
ajkl and ajlk value for Example 1
Node Arcs (k, l) and (l, k)
(1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 3) (3, 1) (2, 3) (3, 2)
1 1 16
7
8 0
1
10 0
2 16 1
1
8 0
7
10 0
3 0 0 0 78 0
7
10
Together with the objective function, constraints (5) ensure that Zkl represents the total coverage
provided to arc (k, l) through nodes k and l. Note that Zkl = 0 unless there are facilities that cover arc
(k, l). Also, (5) and (6) eliminate double-counting of any coverage overlap among k and l.
For Example 1, the parameters ajkl and ajlk are summarized in Table 1.
The problem now can be formulated as follows:
max Z12 + Z13 + Z23
s.t.
y1 + y2 + y3 = 2,
max
{
y1,
1
6 y2
}+ max {16 y1, y2} Z12,
max
{7
8 y1,
1
8 y2
}+ 78 y3Z13,
max
{ 1
10 y1,
7
10 y2
}+ 710 y3Z23,
0Z12, Z13, Z231, y1, y2, y3 = {0, 1}.
The problem has 3 binary variables, 3 continuous variables, 4 constraints and 3 upper bound constraints.
Problem (P2) is a mixed integer non-linear program, which we can solve using Branch and Bound. To
obtain an upper bound, we solve the (LP) relaxation of a new problem called (P′2).
(P′2)
max
∑
(k,l)∈A
wklZkl
s.t. ∑
j∈N
yj = p,
∑
j∈N
yj min{ajkl + ajlk, 1}Zkl (k, l) ∈ A, (7)
0Zkl1 (k, l) ∈ A,
yj = 0, 1, j ∈ N .
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Problems (P′2) and (P2) are identical except for constraints (5) and (7). It is easy to verify that any
solution that is feasible in (P2) is also feasible in (P′2) and therefore (P′2) and certainly the (LP) relaxation
of (P′2) provides an upper bound for (P2). Constraint (7), in fact, overestimates Zkl by double-counting
the coverage provided by different facilities. To illustrate, take two facilities i, j ∈ N and arc (k, l) ∈ A,
where dkl = 10, d(i, k)= 7 and d(j, k)= 5.When coverage distance R = 8, aikl = 0.1 and ajkl = 0.3. In
this example, the actual coverage of arc (k, l) through k is 0.3, whereas adding up the coverage provided
by nodes i and j as in (7) estimates the coverage as 0.4.
Notice that if the optimal solution of the LP relaxation of (P′2) contains only integer values of the yj
variables, this constitutes a feasible solution to (P2) that may serve as a lower bound. In this case, we can
calculate w(S) using (1), where S is the set of the p yj variables equal to 1, and
Zkl(S) = min
{
max
j∈S {ajkl} + maxj∈S {ajlk}, 1
}
. (8)
2.3. Discussion
It is easy to verify that Problem (P2) has considerably less decision variables and constraints than (P1).
Although the non-linear formulation is muchmore compact, (P1) is amenable to solution by a commercial
solver.Our computational experience showed that solving (P1) usingCPLEX ismore efﬁcient than solving
(P2) using our Branch and Bound procedure (where CPLEX is used for solving the LP relaxation of (P′2)
at each node of the tree). For example, for a randomly generated set of 30 problems, each with 150 nodes
and 300 arcs, (P2) required an average of 1.9 h CPU time, whereas an average of 35 s was sufﬁcient
for (P1)-excluding the pre-processing time for generating NIPS and SECs. However, the computational
effort required for solving (P1) increases drastically with problem size as our computational experiments
reported in the next section demonstrate. CPLEX was unable to identify the optimal solution within 24 h
for 22 of the 60 random instances of the 500-node problems we tackled. This calls for the development
of a heuristic procedure for solving large-scale maximal arc-covering problems. As we will show later, a
heuristic (e.g., a greedy heuristic) based on (P2) is more efﬁcient than its counterpart based on (P1), since
the latter involves the calculation of NIPS and all SECs in the pre-processing stage. Another advantage
of (P2) is that it is a direct formulation of the problem and hence easier to understand than (P1). Although
(P1) is in the form of a maximal node-covering formulation, its decision variables are based on NIPS and
SECs that are potentially less communicable to a decision maker.
The greedy heuristic described below is identical for Problems (P1) and (P2), except that for (P1), it is
required in Step 1 also to ﬁnd NIPS and SECk k = 1, . . . , K and in Step 2 Wi(S ∪ {i}) =∑Kk=1 vkgk
where gk = 1 if (S ∪ {i}) ∩ N(SECk) = ∅ and gk = 0 otherwise. It is important to point out that both
heuristics ﬁnd the same solution to the maximal arc-covering problem.
The Greedy Heuristic for P2
Step 1: Set S = ∅, j = 0, N ′ = N
Step 2: j = j + 1
For i ∈ N ′ Do
Wi(S ∪ {i}) = ∑
(k,l)∈A
wklZkl(S ∪ {i}) (using (8))
End for
i∗ = arg max
i∈N ′
Wi(S ∪ {i}),W ∗ = Wi(S ∪ {i∗}), N ′ = N ′ − {i∗}, S = S ∪ {i∗}
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Step 3: If j = p or N ′ = ∅ stop, S is the “optimal” set of locations and W ∗ is the optimal objective
function. Otherwise go to Step 2.
For Example 1:
In Step 1: S = ∅, j = 0, N ′ = {1, 2, 3}.
In Step 2, j = 1,W1({1}) = min
{
1 + 16 , 1
}+ min {78 + 0, 1}+ min { 110 + 0, 1}= 1.975,
W2({2}) = min
{1
6 + 1, 0
}+ min {18 + 0, 1}+ min { 710 + 0, 1}= 1.825,
W3({3}) = min{0 + 0, 1} + min
{
0 + 78 , 1
}+ min { 710 + 0, 1}= .975.
Therefore i∗ = 1, W ∗ = 1.975 and S = {1}. Since j < 2 in Step 3, j = 2, it is easy to verify that
W2({1, 2}) = 2.575 and W3({1, 3}) = 2.8 and therefore i∗ = {3}, S = {1, 3} and W ∗ = 2.8. Since j = 2,
S={1, 3} is the greedy solution with the objective function value of 2.8.We note that the optimal solution
is {2, 3} with W ∗ = 3.
3. Computational experiments
We tested theChurch andMeadows formulation aswell as the greedy heuristic based on our formulation
on 60 randomly generated problem instances. The objective of the computational experiments was two-
fold: (i) to demonstrate the need for the development of a heuristic, and (ii) to investigate the quality
of the solutions provided by the proposed heuristic in tackling large-scale problems. Naturally, these
experiments also helped us to understand how problem parameters impact the required computational
effort. The computations were carried out on a SUNHPC4500 workstation. The heuristic is implemented
in C whereas CPLEX 7.1 is used for solving (P1).
We randomly generated 10 distinct 500-node networks where the number of arcs is derived from a
uniform distribution between 1000 and 3000. In order to ensure connectivity, we ﬁrst randomly generated
a tree with 500 nodes and then randomly added the remaining arcs to the network. The length of each arc
dij is derived from a uniform distribution in the interval [1, 10], and wij = 1 for all arcs.2 We solved six
instances of the problem for each network by varying the number of response facilities to be located and
the coverage distance i.e., p and R. The p values we used are 5 and 10. We made sure that the networks
do satisfy the triangle inequality. The R values are 	k(L1 + L2)
 for k = 16 , 13 , and 12 , where 	.
 denotes
upper ceiling. L1 and L2 are the minimum and maximum path lengths in the node-to-node shortest path
matrix.3
Table 2 reports on our experience with (P1) and shows that the computational requirements of Church
and Meadows formulation can be excessive for large-scale problems. To expose the non-monotonic
computational requirements of (P1), the 500-node networks are sorted in ascending order with respect
to the number of arcs in the table. For the six instances associated with each network, the table depicts
the (average, minimum and maximum) pre-processing times and total CPU times (i.e., pre-process plus
CPLEX). We terminated CPLEX in the event that an optimal solution cannot be identiﬁed within 24 h.
In such cases, which occurred at least once for each network except for Network #1 with the least arc
density, we used 24 h in calculating the average total CPU time. The last column of Table 2 depicts the
number of instances that was solved to optimality within 24 h for each 500-node network we tackled.
2 Variability in the beneﬁt of covering each arc is incorporated in the next section.
3 Each response team will presumably use the shortest path to reach the accident site from its facility.
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Table 2
Computational results with (P1)
Network # No. of arcs Pre-process time Total CPU time No. of opt. (Out of 6)
Average (min) Min. (s) Max. Average Min. (s) Max. (h)
1 1073 44 135 1.5 h 56min 304.6 1.5 6
9 1235 40 95.8 1.6 h 8.9 h 899 > 24 4
4 1347 40 91.5 1.7 h 8.7 h 106.1 > 24 4
10 1418 36 64.6 1.5 h 8.4 h 83.6 > 24 4
5 2130 51 72.08 3.7 h 14 h 82.92 > 24 3
2 2150 18 76 36min 12.5 h 83 > 24 3
6 2221 46 162 1.7 h 12.5 h 304 > 24 3
3 2313 21 90 39min 12.2 h 100 > 24 3
8 2496 51 127 1.9 h 8.3 h 135 > 24 4
7 2587 52 158 1.7 h 6.9 h 176 > 24 4
Table 3
Detailed results for network #5
R P Optimum (s) Heuristic
Prep. Opt. Total Opt. CPU (s) Gap (%)
4 5 72.08 10.84 82.92 Y 2.14 0.001
4 10 72.08 20.31 92.39 Y 6.78 2.33
9 5 1609.2 > 24 h > 24 h N 2.28 −33
9 10 1608.5 > 24 h > 24 h N 7 −13
13 5 5369.7 > 24 h > 24 h N 2.29 0.06
13 10 9535.8 38765 48300.7 Y 7.1 0.03
During our experiments with (P1), we observed that pre-processing can take a considerable time,
which increases with R. The average pre-processing time of the shortest coverage distances for each of
the 10 networks is 1.8min. This increases to 27.4min and 90.3min as R is increased to (L1 + L2)/3
and (L1 + L2)/2, respectively. Observe that in some instances the pre-processing time takes hours. As
expected, the computational requirements increase with the number of facilities p as well.
Now, we focus on Network #5 with 2130 arcs, which proved particularly difﬁcult for the Church and
Meadows formulation. The computational details of the six instances for this network are depicted in
Table 3. In addition to the results of (P1), the table also includes our ﬁndings via the proposed heuristic
based on (P2). The percent gap, depicted in the last column, is calculated by dividing the difference
between the best solution from (P1) and the heuristic solution with the former value. Note that the best
solution from (P1) was optimal only for three instances of this network. More importantly, for R = 9 and
p= 5 CPLEX cannot improve the solution after 24 h and terminates with an optimality gap of 38%. This
solution has a coverage value of 1301, whereas the heuristic solves the problem in 2.3 s with a solution
that gives 1731 coverage (i.e., 81% of the 2130 arcs are covered in the heuristic solution). The negative
gap in Table 3 for this instance indicates that the heuristic indeed ﬁnds a 33% better solution than the
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Table 4
Computational results with the greedy heuristic based on (P2)
Network # No. of arcs CPU average (s) Gap (%)
Average Best Worst
1 1073 2.2 0.23 0 0.7
9 1235 2.6 1 0 3.2
4 1347 4.3 0.118 −0.13 8
10 1418 3.0 1.1 0 3.5
5 2130 4.6 −7.26 −33 2.3
2 2150 4.6 −0.57 −4 0.6
6 2221 4.8 −5.2 −24 0.5
3 2313 5.0 −0.52 −3 1.2
8 2496 5.4 −1.98 −14.6 4.7
7 2587 5.6 −0.238 −38 1.7
Church and Meadows formulation. Interestingly, we were able to obtain a lower bound from the Branch
and Bound procedure on (P2) in 4min that is 1718—which is clearly better than the best solution provided
by (P1) for this instance.
Table 4 presents a summary of our experiments with the heuristic procedure on the same 60 instances.
Note that, on the average, all of the 10 networks were solved within 6 s.As per the worst case performance
of the heuristic, the most challenging 500-node instance took less than nine seconds to solve. More
importantly, the average gaps are negative for those networks with more than 2000 arcs i.e., the heuristic
provided a better solution than that of CPLEX in 24 h. Although the gap can be as high as 38% in favor
of the heuristic (see Network #7 in the table), it is never worse than 8% in favor of (P1).
We note that we have not warm-started CPLEX with the result of the heuristic. We conjecture that it
will allow CPLEX to ﬁnd the optimal solution in less time.
Finally, it is obvious that our greedy heuristic dominates a greedy heuristic based on the Church and
Meadows formulation that will incur the pre-processing times in Table 3 required to calculate the NIPS
and SECs. We also believe that combining our heuristic with another procedure like an exchange routine
can improve the heuristic further without signiﬁcantly increasing the CPU time.
4. The Quebec–Ontario problem
In this section,we study the emergency response infrastructure for gasoline incidents on the highway
networks of Quebec and Ontario in Canada. Our aim is to provide an assessment of the coverage provided
by the current system and to demonstrate the improvement that can be achieved via the proposed method-
ology. Verter and Kara [13] showed that Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are essential means
for large-scale risk assessment endeavors. Thus, we derived the model parameters from a GIS-based
representation of the two provinces. We used ArcView 3.1 GIS software to superimpose three layers of
digital maps: the population zones, the road network and the origin-destination points for each shipment.
This enabled us to estimate the route choices of hazmat carriers and the resulting level of population
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exposure around each highway link. The coverage provided by each alternative response team station
was also determined via the GIS-based representation.
The data set for this application is compiled from a number of sources. Statistics Canada keeps a
record of each hazmat shipment including its origin, destination, type of material, number of truck-loads
and monetary value. These records indicate that 102,420 truck-loads of gasoline were carried between
251 origin-destination pairs in 1998. Transport Canada [2] requires evacuation of the people residing
within 800m of a gasoline spill.We obtained population data from the 1996 census, which contains 1149
sub-divisions in Quebec and 543 sub-divisions in Ontario. Most of these zones have very low population
density. Thus, our model includes only those census sub-divisions with population density higher than 40
people/km2. This amounts to 108 zones in Quebec with a total population of 3.8 million and 72 zones in
Ontario with a total population of 7.6 million. Our highway network model is based on the ArcView 3.1
map and it has 205 arcs and 176 nodes. An arc corresponds to an urban road if it lies within a population
center and it is considered a rural road otherwise.We assume that response teams travel 50 km/h on urban
roads and 90 km/h on rural roads. These average travel speeds translate coverage distances to response
times.
To derive problem parameters, we assume that hazmat carriers use the shortest path for each shipment.
This allows us to estimate the number of gasoline trucks on each highway link. Through GIS, we also
determine the number of people living within 800m of each link. Themultiplication of these two numbers
for a highway link gives the total population exposure (in truck-people), which we use as a proxy of the
beneﬁt of providing full coverage to the link i.e., wij . Interestingly, only 95 of the 205 arcs have wij > 0
in this instance, and wij has a large range of values. We avoid potential stability problems during the
solution process by normalizing arc weights in the model i.e., we divide each wij by maxij wij . The
highway link with maximum population exposure is in Toronto. The total beneﬁt of covering all the 95
arcs with wij > 0 is 5.0513, which we use as a benchmark.
There are 23 gasoline shipment origins in Quebec and Ontario with a wide range of activity levels.
Four of these origins account for 78% of the 102,420 shipments,4 whereas three origins ship less than
50 gasoline trucks annually. The major shipment origins in the two provinces are depicted in Fig. 2. As
mentioned in Section 1, hazmat shippers in Canada are responsible from emergencies during transport.
Most major shippers, such as Shell, PetroCanada and Ultramar, employ their own specialized response
team, whereas small-scale shippers often outsource their ERAP to a third party. Thus, we represent the
existing emergency response network via a response team station at each shipment origin, except for the
three smallest sites. Our calculations indicate that the current 20-team system requires more than 1.5 h
to provide full coverage. More speciﬁcally, the total coverage within 90min is 4.9507, which amounts to
98% of the benchmark.
The current specialized response team locations certainly provide convenience in stationing the teams
and their equipment. Intuitively, however, the shipment origins are not necessarily the best sites for
maximizing coverage to possible road incidents. We analyzed the extent of improvement that can be
achieved via optimizing the emergency network design. To facilitate the analysis, we solved the problem
for response times of 30, 60 and 90min. We solved the problem using the Branch and Bound algorithm
from (P2). Table 5 provides a comparison of the coverage provided by the current and proposed response
networks. Note that the proposed 20-team network covers 97% of the highway network within 30min,
4 Toronto 30,440 trucks, La Cote de Beupre 28,561 trucks, Laval(North ofMontreal) 10,758 trucks and Brant County 10,577
trucks.
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Fig. 2. Origins of major gasoline shipments (size of circular points is proportional to the annual amount of shipment).
Table 5
Coverage percentages for the Quebec–Ontario problem
Response time (min) Current 20-team Proposed 20-team Proposed 14-team
30 59.8 96.7 96.7
60 92.2 98.1 97.5
90 98.0 99.9 99.9
whereas the current system needs about 90min to provide the same coverage. In other words, it is possible
to achieve a remarkable 67% reduction in the threshold time that deﬁne coverage for gasoline incidents
by optimizing the location of the 20 response teams.
Re-location of response team stations requires a capital outlay, which may be excessive for small-scale
shippers. Therefore, in re-designing the emergency response network, we focus on the shipments that
involve more than 1000 truck-loads of gasoline annually. There are 14 such shipment origins, and hence
Table 5 also depicts the coverage statistics for the proposed 14-team network. Interestingly, the percent
coverage remains almost at the same level despite the 30% reduction in the number of response teams.
The optimal solution provides 97.9% coverage. More importantly, only two of the 14 teams are located
at their current site in the optimal solution.
Provincial governments of Quebec and Ontario have jurisdiction over highway shipments of dangerous
goods. The above analysis, however, adopts a holistic approach in modeling the highway networks of
the two provinces as a single entity. There are obvious challenges associated with the implementation
of such a multi-province solution. To determine the beneﬁts of the holistic approach, we also optimized
each province’s response network in isolation. Currently, there are 5 response stations in Quebec and
O. Berman et al. / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 1374–1388 1387
15 stations in Ontario. For a response time of 30min, the maximum coverage of the 5-team network in
Quebec is 1.7 and that of the 15-team network in Ontario is 3.19. Thus, the total coverage provided in the
two provinces is 4.89, which is equal to the coverage provided by the holistic approach (i.e., 96.7% of
the benchmark as depicted in Table 5). The additional coverage provided by streamlining the provincial
networks is also marginal for response times of 60 and 90min. Consequently, the time and effort required
for coordinating the emergency response network re-design processes in the two provinces would be hard
to justify.
5. Concluding comments
Time is of the essence in responding to hazmat incidents. Quick arrival of a specialized team at the
incident site can reduce the undesirable impact considerably. Response time depends on the distance be-
tween the specialized team station and the incident site. Therefore, the locations of response team stations
constitute a major factor in the design of an emergency response network for dangerous goods incidents
in a region. In this paper, we present the maximal arc-covering location model as a means to optimize
the structure of an emergency response network. We discussed two formulations to solve the maximal
arc-covering location problem, a known one and a new one.An application of the proposed methodology
in Quebec and Ontario pointed out the possibility of a signiﬁcant improvement in response capability via
relocation of the existing stations. Naturally, the implementation phase requires an agreement between
the provincial governments and the hazmat shippers with regard to the allotment of relocation costs.
The likelihood that a response team will be busy at the time of an incident has attracted considerable
attention in the maximal covering literature since the seminal work of Daskin [14]. Given the very low
probabilities associated with hazmat incidents, however, the occurrence of multiple accidents within the
response area of a specialized team is highly unlikely. Therefore, in the context of hazmat transportation,
we can safely assume that the response teams will be available at all times.
The notion of gradual covering decay, recently proposed by Berman et al. [15], provides a promising
avenue for future research. In this paper, we followed the traditional approach in considering a poten-
tial accident site “uncovered,” if a response team cannot reach this point within the threshold time. In
responding to a hazmat incident, however, a specialized team can still mitigate some of the impact de-
spite arriving after the threshold time. The incorporation of gradual covering decay requires the use of a
dynamic transport risk model that accounts for the time distribution of undesirable consequences.
Recently, Kara and Verter [16] developed a model to determine the road network that can be used for
hazmat shipments so as to minimize the total transport risk in a region. The integration of their hazmat
network design model with the model proposed in this paper is non-trivial from a solution methodology
perspective. Nonetheless, it would be an important step toward the development of a comprehensive
transport risk mitigation policy.
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